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Using an extended framework in which an agent is endowed with three types
of preference orders: an allocation preference order, an opportunity prefer-
ence order, and an overall preference order, this paper introduces several
notions related to eﬃciency and equity-as-no-envy and examines the perfor-
mance of competitive market mechanisms. We also axiomatically character-
ize the equal income Walras rule for pure exchange economies.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D711 Introduction
Recently Suzumura and Xu (1999, 2000) have developed an extended frame-
work in which an agent is modelled to have extended preferences such as
follows: it is better for the agent to have a consequence x from an opportu-
nity set A than to have a consequence y from an opportunity set B. Following
Suzumura and Xu (1999, 2000), this paper is to develop a similar extended
framework to re-examine some classical problems of eﬃciency and equity-as-
no-envy of competitive market mechanisms. Our fundamental standpoint is
that the performance of economic mechanisms should be evaluated on the
bases of not only ﬁnal consumption bundles of agents but also opportunity
sets from which consumption bundles are chosen. This approach is in line
with the recent contributions in the literature of non-welfaristic approach to
welfare economics and social choice (see, among others, Pattanaik and Xu
(1990), and Sen (1988, 1997)).
Given an economy, we deﬁne a conﬁguration as a pair of an allocation
and a distribution of opportunity sets. Thus, a conﬁguration speciﬁes a ﬁnal
consumption bundle and an opportunity set for each agent in the economy. A
pair of a consumption bundle and an associated opportunity set is called an
individual state. Each agent is assumed to be endowed with three preference
orders: an allocation preference order that ranks consumption bundles, an
opportunity preference order that ranks opportunity sets, and an overall pref-
erence order that ranks individual states. Based on each of the three types of
preference orders, we introduce the notions of Pareto-optimality and no-envy.
In the literature, Pareto-optimality and no-envy with respect only to allo-
cation preference orders have been considered. Allocation-Pareto-optimality
corresponds to the usual eﬃciency notion in economics. Allocation-No-Envy
was introduced by Kolm (1971) and Foley (1967), and has been discussed
extensively in the literature. (See, for example, the survey of Thomson and
Varian (1985).) It requires that no agent prefers the consumption bundle of
any other agent to his own.
The notions of no-envy and Pareto-optimality based on opportunity pref-
erence orders and overall preference orders are new. We say that a conﬁgura-
tion is opportunity-envy-free if no agent prefers any other agent’s opportunity
set to his opportunity set. In the literature, there have been some discussions
of equality of opportunities that are related to our notion of opportunity-no-
envy. On one hand, authors like Archibald and Donaldson (1979), Klappholz
(1972), and Thomson (1994) start with equality of opportunities as identical
3opportunity sets for the agents in the economy.1 On the other hand, there
is an increasing literature that discusses various issues relating to equality
in the distribution of opportunity sets. (See Peragine (1999) for a survey of
this literature.) We say that a conﬁguration is overall-envy-free if no agent
prefers the individual state of any other agent to his own.
We say that a feasible conﬁguration is opportunity-Pareto-optimal if there
exists no other feasible conﬁguration at which every agent’s opportunity set
is at least as good as the original one, and some agent’s opportunity set
is strictly better than the original one. Similarly, a feasible conﬁguration is
overall-Pareto-optimal if there exists no other feasible conﬁguration at which
the individual state of every agent is at least as good as the original one, and
the individual state of some agent is strictly better than the original one.
These notions are natural extensions of the standard notions of allocation-
no-envy and allocation Pareto-optimality in our framework.
Equipped with these concepts, we examine the performance of competi-
tive market mechanisms. We also axiomatically characterize the equal income
Walras rule.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay
down the basic notation and deﬁnitions. Section 3 introduces the concepts
of Pareto-optimality and no-envy in our framework, and then examines the
logical relationships among those concepts. In Section 4, we introduce sev-
eral normative properties to be imposed on social choice rules. Section 5
provides characterizations of the equal income Walras rule for pure exchange
economies. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Allocations, Opportunities and Conﬁgura-
tions
There are n agents and k goods. Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of agents.
An allocation is a vector x =( x1,...,x n) ∈ Rnk
+ where for each i ∈ N,
xi =( xi1,...,x ik) ∈ Rk
+ is a consumption bundle of agent i.2 There exist
some ﬁxed amounts of social endowments of goods, which are represented by
the vector Ω ∈ Rk
++. An allocation x ∈ Rnk
+ is feasible if
n
i=1xi ≤ Ω.3 Let
1Thomson (1994) also discusses other notions of equality of opportunities.
2As usual, R+ is the set of all non-negative real numbers, and R++ is the set of all
positive real numbers.
3Vector inequalities are as usual: ≥,>and >>.
4Z be the set of all feasible allocations.
For each i ∈ N,a nopportunity set for agent i is a set in Rk
+. We consider a
particular class of opportunity sets, namely the class of budget sets. For each
i ∈ N,abudget set for agent i at a price vector p ∈ Rk
+ and a consumption
bundle xi ∈ Rk
+ is deﬁned by
B(p,xi)={yi ∈ R
k
+ | p · yi ≤ p · xi}
Let B = {B(p,xi) | p ∈ Rk
+,x i ∈ Rk
+}.A distribution of budget sets is an
n-tuple B =( B1,...,B n) ∈B n.Aconﬁguration is a pair (x,B) ∈ Rnk
+ ×B n
such that xi ∈ Bi for all i ∈ N. For each (x,B) ∈ Rnk
+ ×B n and each i ∈ N,
the individual state of agent i at (x,B) is the pair (xi,B i).
A conﬁguration (x,B) ∈ Rnk
+ is feasible in the market economy if x ∈ Z
and there exist p ∈ Rk
+ and ω =( ω1,...,ω n) ∈ Z such that Bi = B(p,ωi)
for all i ∈ N. Let Z be the set of all conﬁgurations that are feasible in the
market economy.
Note that the feasibility condition above requires that the distribution of
budget sets is generated from an initial feasible allocation and a price vector,
and that for each agent, the speciﬁed consumption bundle is in his budget
set. However, whether an agent actually chooses the consumption bundle
depends on his preferences. (See the notion of “decentralizability” which will
be introduced later.)
Given a set X,apreference order on X is a reﬂexive, transitive and
complete binary relation on X. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with the
following three preference orders.4
1. An allocation preference order on Rk
+, denoted RA
i , which is continuous,
monotonic and convex.
2. An opportunity preference order on B, denoted RO
i , which is monotonic
in the following sense:
(i) ∀B1,B 2 ∈B ,B 1 ⊆ B2 ⇒ B2 RO
i B1
4One could argue that the overall preference order is closely related to the allocation
preference order and the opportunity preference order, and perhaps can be obtained by
aggregating the allocation preference order and the opportunity preference order. This
can be the case (see, for example, Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994), and Suzumura and
Xu (2000) for some discussions of the related issues). Since we focus on examining the
performance of competitive market mechanisms in the extended framework, we do not wish
to discuss the aggregation problem, if there is any, in detail. Instead, we simply assume
that the overall preference order is monotonically linked with the allocation preference
order and the opportunity preference order.
5(ii) ∀B1,B 2 ∈B ,B 1 ⊂ intB2 ⇒ B2 PO
i B1, where intB2 is the relative interior
of B2 in Rk
+.5
3. An overall preference order on Rk




∀(xi,B i),(yi,C i) ∈ Rk
+ ×B
(i) xi RA
i yi and Bi RO
i Ci ⇒ (xi,B i) ¯ Ri (yi,C i)
(ii) xi PA
i yi and Bi PO
i Ci ⇒ (xi,B i) ¯ Pi (yi,C i)
Let RA,RO, and ¯ R denote the classes of allocation preference orders,
opportunity preference orders, and overall preference orders, respectively.
Let R = RA ×R O × ¯ R.Apreference proﬁle is a list R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n
where Ri =( RA
i ,R O
i , ¯ Ri) for all i ∈ N.
Let Ri =( RA
i ,R O
i , ¯ Ri) ∈Rbe given. We say that agent i ∈ N is a conse-
quentialist at R if ∀(xi,B i),(yi,C i) ∈ Rk
+ ×B:( xi,B i)¯ Ri(yi,C i) ⇔ xi RA
i yi.
We say that agent i ∈ N is a non-consequentialist at R if ∀(xi,B i),(yi,C i) ∈
Rk
+ ×B:( xi,B i)¯ Ri(yi,C i) ⇔ Bi RO
i Ci.6
A social choice rule is a mapping ϕ that associates with each R ∈R n a
non-empty set ϕ(R) ⊆ Z. Given an R ∈R n and given a social choice rule ϕ,
let ϕZ(R)={x ∈ Z |∃ B ∈B n, (x,B) ∈ ϕ(R)}.
3 Pareto-Optimality and No-Envy
In this paper, we focus on “decentralizable” conﬁgurations, at which the
speciﬁed consumption bundle for each agent is actually the best one in his
opportunity set by his allocation preference order. If a conﬁguration (x,B)
were not decentralizable, then there had to be some restriction on the free-
dom of choice for some agents. Hence, decentralizability is a fundamental
requirement of autonomous decisions. (See discussions on concepts of free-
dom in Sen (1993).)
Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be given, where Ri =( RA
i ,R O
i , ¯ Ri) for all
i ∈ N. We say that a conﬁguration (x,B) ∈ Z is decentralizable for R if for
all i ∈ N and all yi ∈ Bi, xi RA
i yi. Let D(R) denote the set of decentralizable
conﬁgurations for R.
5As usual, the strict preference order associated to RO
i is denoted P O
i . Similar notation
is used for other preference orders.
6Our notions of a consequentialist and a non-consequentialist correspond, respectively,
to an extreme consequentialist and an extreme non-consequentialist proposed in Suzumura
and Xu (1999, 2000)
6A conﬁguration (y,C) ∈ Z allocation-Pareto-dominates (x,B) ∈ Z for
R if yi RA
i xi for all i ∈ N and yi PA
i xi for some i ∈ N. A conﬁgura-
tion (x,B) ∈ Z is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R if no feasible conﬁguration
allocation-Pareto-dominates it. Let EA(R) be the set of allocation-Pareto-
optimal conﬁgurations for R. We deﬁne opportunity-Pareto-domination and
opportunity-Pareto-optimality by replacing allocation preference orders with
opportunity preference orders in the above deﬁnitions. We also deﬁne anal-
ogously overall-Pareto-domination and overall-Pareto-optimality based on
overall preference orders.
Given our assumptions on RA
i for all i ∈ N, the following proposition is
immediate.
Proposition 1 For every R ∈R n, if a feasible conﬁguration is decentraliz-
able for R, then it is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R.
Sen (1993) considers the following conditions of opportunity preference
orders (See Sen’s Axiom O on p.530):
(i) for all Bi,C i ∈B , Bi RO
i Ci only if there exists xi ∈ Bi such that xi RA
i yi
for all yi ∈ Ci, and
(ii) for all Bi,C i ∈B , Bi PO
i Ci only if there exists xi ∈ Bi such that xi PA
i yi
for all yi ∈ Ci.
Let ˆ RO be the class of opportunity preference orders satisfying the above
conditions.
Although Sen (1993) introduces these conditions as necessary conditions
for opportunity preferences, it turns out that under completeness of oppor-
tunity preference orders, these are also suﬃcient conditions. Then, the next
result immediately follows from Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 [Sen, 1993, p.534] Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be suchth at
for all i ∈ N, RO
i ∈ ˆ RO. Then, no decentralizable conﬁguration for R is
opportunity-Pareto-dominated by another decentralizable conﬁgurations for
R.
We can extend the above result to overall-Pareto-optimality.
Proposition 3 Let R =( R1,...,R n) ∈R n be suchth at for all i ∈ N,
RO
i ∈ ˆ RO. Then, no decentralizable conﬁguration for R is overall-Pareto-
dominated by another decentralizable conﬁguration for R.
7Proof: Let (x,B) ∈ Z be a decentralizable conﬁguration for R. By Propo-
sition 1, (x,B) is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R. Suppose to the contrary
that there exists (y,C) ∈ Z that is decentralizable for R, and that overall-
Pareto-dominates (x,B). Since (y,C) overall-Pareto-dominates (x,B), we
have that
(i) for all i ∈ N,(yi,C i)¯ Ri(xi,B i) and
(ii) for some j ∈ N,(yj,C j)¯ Pj(xj,B j).
From (ii) and by the deﬁnition of the overall preference order ¯ Rj, it follows
that (ii.1) yj PA
j xj or (ii.2) Cj PO
j Bj. Suppose that (ii.1) holds. Since (x,B)
is allocation-Pareto-optimal for R, there exists h ∈ N such that xh PA
h yh.
From the deﬁnition of ¯ Rh and (i) requiring (yh,C h)¯ Rh(xh,B h), we must have
Ch RO
h Bh. Because RO
h ∈ ˆ RO, there exists zh ∈ Ch such that zh RA
h wh for
all wh ∈ Bh. Since (y,C) is decentralizable, it follows that yh RA
h zh, and by
the transitivity of RA
h, yh RA
h wh for all wh ∈ Bh. Letting wh = xh, we have
a contradiction with xh PA
h yh.
Suppose that (ii.2) holds. Then, from RO
j ∈ ˆ RO, there exists zj ∈ Cj
such that zj PA
j wj for all wj ∈ Bj. Since (y,C) is decentralizable, we have
yj RA
j zj, and yj PA
j wj for all wj ∈ Bj. Hence, yj PA
j xj. Starting with this
and from (ii.1), we can derive a contradiction. In summary, therefore, (x,B)
cannot be overall-Pareto-dominatedby another decentralizable conﬁguration.
In the literature on opportunity set rankings, many authors have con-
sidered and axiomatically characterized opportunity preference orders that
do not belong to ˆ RO (See, for example, Pattanaik and Xu (1990).) For
such preference orders, a decentralizable conﬁguration may be opportunity-
Pareto-dominated by another decentralizable conﬁguration. Consider the
following example.
Example 1. There are two agents N = {1,2} and two goods. Deﬁne
RO
1 ∈R O as follows: for all B1,C 1 ∈B , B1 RO
1 C1 if and only if the area of
B1 is greater than or equal to that of C1. Deﬁne RO
2 ∈R O as follows: for all
B2,C 2 ∈B , B2 RO
2 C2 if and only if there exists x2 ∈ B2 such that x2 RA
2 y2
for all y2 ∈ C2. Note that RO
2 ∈ ˆ RO, but RO
1  ∈ ˆ RO. Let RA
1 ,R A
2 ∈R A be such
that the indiﬀerence curves are drawn as in Figure 1. In the Edgeworth box,
(x,B) and (y,C) are two decentralizable conﬁgurations such that x2 PA
2 y2
and the area of B1 is greater than that of C1. Hence, for all i ∈ N, Bi PO
i Ci.








































Figure 1: A decentalizable conﬁguration may be opportunity-Pareto-
dominated by another decentralizable conﬁguration (Example 1).
Note that in the economy of Example 1, the “transfer paradox” occurs:7
when the initial allocation is changed from ω to ω , namely, when some
amounts of both goods are transferred from agent 2 to agent 1, agent 1 is
nevertheless worse oﬀ at his equilibrium consumption bundle according to
his allocation preference order. Despite this fact, agent 1 may prefer having
the opportunity set B1 generated by the initial bundle ω 
1 rather than C1
corresponding to ω1 according to his opportunity preference order.
The above example shows the vulnerability of Sen’s result claiming the
opportunity-Pareto-optimality of a decentralizable conﬁguration. The oppor-
tunity preference order that Sen considers is very restrictive, and if we drop
the restriction, we can no longer guarantee opportunity-Pareto-optimality of
a decentralizable conﬁguration.
The example can also be extended to overall-Pareto-optimality: for some
class of opportunity preference orders, a decentralizable conﬁguration may
7The “transfer paradox” was ﬁrst pointed out by Leontief (1936).
9be overall-Pareto-dominated by another decentralizable conﬁguration. This
is the case when, for instance, agent 1 is a non-consequentialist and agent 2
a consequentialist in the above example.
Next, we introduce the concepts of equity-as-no-envy. A conﬁguration
(x,B) ∈ Z is allocation-envy-free for R if for all i,j ∈ N, xi RA
i xj. Let
F A(R) be the set of allocation-envy-free conﬁgurations for R. A conﬁguration
(x,B) ∈ Z is opportunity-envy-free for R if for all i,j ∈ N, Bi RO
i Bj. Let
F O(R) be the set of opportunity-envy-free conﬁgurations for R. A conﬁgura-
tion (x,B) ∈ Z is overall-envy-free for R if for all i,j ∈ N,( xi,B i)¯ Ri(xj,B j).
Let ¯ F(R) be the set of overall-envy-free conﬁgurations for R.
The next result follows from the monotonic link between the allocation
preference order, the opportunity preference order, and the overall preference
order.
Proposition 4 For every R ∈R n, if a conﬁguration is allocation-envy-free
and opportunity-envy-free for R, then it is overall-envy-free for R.
Proof. Suppose that (x,B) ∈ Z is both allocation-envy-free and
opportunity-envy-free for R. Since (x,B) is allocation-envy-free, we have
xi RA
i xj for all i,j ∈ N. Similarly, Bi RO
i Bj for all i,j ∈ N follows
from (x,B) being opportunity-envy-free. Then, from the deﬁnition of ¯ Ri for
each i ∈ N, we have (xi,B i)¯ Ri(xj,B j) for all i,j ∈ N. Therefore, (x,B)i s
overall-envy-free.
With decentralizability, we have the following logical relations:8
opportunity-no-envy implies both allocation-no-envy and overall-no-envy;
overall-no-envy implies allocation-no-envy but dose not imply opportunity-
no-envy; allocation-no-envy implies neither opportunity-no-envy nor overall-
no-envy.
Proposition 5
(i) There exist R ∈R n and (x,B) ∈ Z suchth at (x,B) is decentralizable and
allocation-envy-free but is neither opportunity-envy-free nor overall-envy-free
for R.
(ii) For every R ∈R n,i f(x,B) ∈ Z is decentralizable and opportunity-envy-
free for R, then it is allocation-envy-free and overall-envy-free for R.
8Without decentralizability, there is no logical relation between any two of the three
conditions of no-envy.
10(iii) For every R ∈R n,i f(x,B) ∈ Z is decentralizable and overall-envy-free
for R, then it is allocation-envy-free for R. However, there exist R ∈R n and
(x,B) ∈ Z suchth at (x,B) is decentralizable and overall-envy-free but is not
opportunity-envy-free for R.
Proof. (i) For simplicity, we consider a two-agent and two-good economy,
and assume that Ω = (10,10). Suppose that RA
1 and RA
2 are represented by







Let x1 =( 3 , 120
19 ) and x2 =( 7 , 70
19), and let x =( x1,x 2). Deﬁne p = (20,19).
Let B1 = B(p,x1),B 2 = B(p,x2) and B =( B1,B 2). Then, (x,B)i sa
decentralizable conﬁguration. Because U1(x1) >U 1(x2) and U2(x2) >U 2(x1),
(x,B) is allocation-envy-free. However, since B1 ⊂ intB2, we have B2 PO
1
B1. Hence, (x,B) is not opportunity-envy-free. Let ¯ R1 ∈ ¯ R be such that
(x2,B 2)¯ P1(x1,B 1).9 For such ¯ R,( x,B) is not overall-envy-free.
(ii) Let R ∈R n be given, and let (x,B) ∈ Z be a decentralizable and
opportunity-envy-free conﬁguration for R. Since (x,B) is decentralizable,
there exists a price vector p ∈ Rk
+ such that for all i ∈ N, Bi = B(p,xi).
If for some i,j ∈ N, Bi  = Bj, then either Bi ⊂ intBj or Bj ⊂ intBi.B y
monotonicity of RO
i and RO
j , this implies that either Bj PO
i Bi or Bi PO
j Bj,
which is in contradiction with the assumption that (x,B) is opportunity-
envy-free. Hence, it must be true that for all i,j ∈ N,Bi = Bj. Because
(x,B) is decentralizable, for all i,j ∈ N and all yj ∈ Bj = Bi, xi RA
i yj.I n
particular, xi RA
i xj. Thus, (x,B) is allocation-envy-free. From Proposition
4, (x,B) is also overall-envy-free.
(iii) Let R ∈R n be given and let (x,B) ∈ Z be a decentralizable con-
ﬁguration for R where Bi = B(p∗,x i) for all i ∈ N. Suppose that (x,B)
is not allocation-envy-free for R. Without loss of generality, suppose that
x2 PA
1 x1. Since (x,B) is decentralizable, x1 RA y1 for all y1 ∈ B1. Hence,
we must have that x2 / ∈ B1. Because B1 = B(p∗,x 1),B 2 = B(p∗,x 2) and
x2 / ∈ B1, we have B1 ⊂ intB2. It follows from strict monotonicity of RO
1 that
B2 PO
1 B1. Together with x2 PA
1 x1, we have (x2,B 2)¯ P1(x1,B 1). Therefore,
(x,B) is not overall-envy-free for R. Thus, if (x,B) is decentralizable and
overall-envy-free, then it must be allocation-envy-free.
9This relation holds if, for example, agent 1 is a non-consequentialist.
11Next, consider the same economy as (i) above, the same allocation prefer-
ence orders and opportunity preference orders, and the conﬁguration (x,B).
However, let ¯ R1 ∈ ¯ R be such that (x1,B 1)¯ R1(x2,B 2). Then, (x,B) is decen-
tralizable and overall-envy-free, but is not opportunity-envy-free.
4 Properties of Social Choice Rules
In this section, we propose several normative properties that a social choice
rule should satisfy. Let ϕ denote a social choice rule throughout this section.
The ﬁrst property, Decentralizability, requires a rule to guarantee au-
tonomous choice of every individual from the opportunity set assigned to
him.
Decentralizability: ∀R ∈R n,ϕ(R) ⊆ D(R).
The next property, Allocation-Pareto-Optimality, requires that the ﬁnal
allocations of resources should be Pareto-eﬃcient (in the standard sense).
Allocation-Pareto-Optimality: ∀R ∈R n,ϕ(R) ⊆ EA(R)
By Proposition 1, Decentralizability implies Allocation-Pareto-
Optimality. That is, for all R ∈R n, D(R) ⊆ EA(R).
The next three properties, Allocation-No-Envy, Opportunity-No-Envy
and Overall-No-Envy, are concerned about the distributional equity of con-
ﬁgurations chosen by a social choice rule. Allocation-No-Envy, for example,
requires that any conﬁgurations selected by the rule should be allocation-
envy-free. The meanings of Opportunity-No-Envy and Overall-No-Envy are
analogous.
Allocation-No-Envy: ∀R ∈R n,ϕ(R) ⊆ F A(R)
Opportunity-No-Envy: ∀R ∈R n,ϕ(R) ⊆ F O(R)
Overall-No-Envy: ∀R ∈R n,ϕ(R) ⊆ ¯ F(R)
Our ﬁnal properties, Allocation Independence and Independence, are
about informational requirements of a social choice rule. Allocation Inde-
pendence requires that the selection of allocations depends on agents’ allo-
cation preference orders only: if two preference proﬁles R and R  are such
12that RA
i = R A
i for all i ∈ N, then the allocations ﬁgured in conﬁgurations
selected by a social choice rule for R are identical to those chosen for R .10 In-
dependence stipulates that the selection of conﬁgurations depends on agents’
allocation preference orders and opportunity preference orders: if two pref-
erence proﬁles R and R  are such that RA
i = R A
i for all i ∈ N and RO
i = R O
i
for all i ∈ N, then the conﬁgurations selected by a social choice rule for R
are identical to those chosen for R . Formally, they may be stated as follows.
Allocation Independence: ∀R,R  ∈R n, if RA
i = R A
i for all i ∈ N, then
ϕZ(R)=ϕZ(R ).
Independence: ∀R,R  ∈R n, if RA
i = R A
i and RO
i = R O
i for all i ∈ N,
then ϕ(R)=ϕ(R ).
5 Characterizations of the Equal Income
Walras Rule
The Equal Income Walras Rule, denoted W e, is deﬁned as follows. For every
R ∈R n:( x,B) ∈ W e(R) if and only if there exists p ∈ Rk
+ such that for
each i ∈ N, Bi = B(p,
Ω
n),x i ∈ Bi, and xi RA
i yi for all yi ∈ Bi.
Note that for all R ∈R n,
W
e(R) ⊆ D(R) ∩ F
A(R) ∩ F
O(R) ∩ ¯ F(R)
and that W e satisﬁes Independence as well as Allocation Independence.
From the proof of Proposition 5(ii), it is clear that for every R ∈R n,i f
(x,B) is decentralizable and opportunity-envy-free for R, then x is an equal
income Walras allocation. The next proposition immediately follows from
this observation.
Proposition 6 A social choice rule ϕ satisﬁes Decentralizability and
Opportunity-No-Envy if and only if ϕ(R) ⊆ W e(R) for all R ∈R n.
It should be noted that, from Propositions 5, if a conﬁguration is decen-
tralizable and is opportunity-envy-free, then it is both allocation-envy-free
10As a “dual” to Allocation Independence, we may deﬁne Opportunity Independence
requiring that the selection of distributions of opportunity sets depends on agents’ oppor-
tunity preference orders only. However, it can be shown that there exists no social choice
rule satisfying Opportunity Independence and Decentralizability together.
13and overall-envy-free. However, when a conﬁguration is decentralizable and
overall-envy-free, it is allocation-envy-free but may not be opportunity-envy-
free. In other words, in the presence of Decentralizability, Opportunity-No-
Envy is more demanding than Overall-No-Envy, which is in turn stronger
than Allocation-No-Envy.
The following proposition “partially” characterizes the equal income Wal-
ras rule by using the notion of Overall-No-Envy.
Proposition 7
(i) The equal income Walras rule W e satisﬁes Allocation Independence, De-
centralizability and Overall-No-Envy.
(ii) If a social choice rule ϕ satisﬁes Allocation Independence, Decentraliz-
ability and Overall-No-Envy, then ϕZ(R) ⊆ W e
Z(R) for all R ∈R n.
Proof. Clearly, W e satisﬁes Allocation Independence, Decentralizability and
Overall-No-Envy.
Let ϕ be a social choice rule satisfying Allocation Independence, De-
centralizability and Overall-No-Envy. Suppose that there exist R ∈R n
and x ∈ ϕZ(R) such that x/ ∈ W e
Z(R). Let R  ∈R n be such that for all
i ∈ N, R A
i = RA
i , and all i are non-consequentialists at R . By Alloca-
tion Independence, x ∈ ϕZ(R ). Let B ∈B n be such that (x,B) ∈ ϕ(R ).
Since ϕ satisﬁes Decentralizability, (1) there exists p ∈ Rk
+ such that for all
i ∈ N, Bi = B(p,xi) and for all yi ∈ Bi, xi R A
i yi.I f ( x,B) ∈ W e(R ),
then x ∈ W e
Z(R ), and since W e satisﬁes Allocation Independence, we have
x ∈ W e
Z(R), which is a contradiction. Thus, (x,B) / ∈ W e(R ). From (1),
(x,B) / ∈ W e(R ) holds true only if there exist h,j ∈ N such that Bh ⊂ intBj.
But then, because agent h is a non-consequentialist at R ,( xj,B j)¯ P
 
h(xh,B h),
which means that (x,B) / ∈ ¯ F(R ). Since ϕ satisﬁes Overall-No-Envy, we
must have (x,B) / ∈ ϕ(R ), a contradiction with (x,B) ∈ ϕ(R ). Thus, for all
R ∈R n, ϕZ(R) ⊆ W e
Z(R).
Two remarks are in order. First, the conclusion in part (ii) of Proposition
7 cannot be strengthened to ϕ(R) ⊆ W e(R) for all R ∈R n as the next
counterexample shows. Deﬁne the social choice rule ψ as follows: if every
i ∈ N is a consequentialist at R ∈R n, then
ψ(R)={(x,B) | x ∈ W
e




14Then, ψ satisﬁes Decentralizability, Allocation Independence and Overall-
No-Envy. However, there exists R∗ ∈R n such that ψ(R∗)  ⊆ W e(R∗). In-
deed, let N = {1,2},k = 2, and Ω = (10,10). Suppose that both agents 1
and 2 are consequentialists at R∗ ∈R 2, and that R∗A
1 and R∗A
2 are repre-
sented by the following utility functions:
U1(x11,x 12)=x11 +2 x12
U2(x21,x 22)=2 x21 + x22
Then, (x,B) ∈ ψ(R∗) if and only if x = ((0,10),(10,0)) and for some





p2 ≤ 2, Bi = B(p,xi) for all i ∈ N. If we take
(p1,p 2) such that
p1
p2  = 1, then B1  = B2, and hence (x,B) / ∈ W e(R∗). Thus,
ψ(R∗)  ⊆ W e(R∗).
Secondly, in the hypothesis in part (ii) of Proposition 7, Overall-No-Envy
cannot be weakened (in the presence of Decentralizability) to Allocation-No-
Envy: there exists a social choice rule that satisﬁes Allocation Independence,
Decentralizability and Allocation-No-Envy, and that ϕZ(R)  ⊆ W e
Z(R) for
some R ∈R n. For example, deﬁne the social choice rule Ψ by Ψ(R)=
D(R) ∩ F A(R) for all R ∈R n. Then, Ψ satisﬁes the above three properties,
and yet ΨZ(R) ⊃ W e
Z(R),ΨZ(R)  = W e
Z(R) for some R ∈R n.
To completely characterize the equal income Walras rule using the no-
tion of Overall-No-Envy, we turn to the following proposition which uses
Independence.
Proposition 8
(i) The equal income Walras rule W e satisﬁes Independence, Decentralizabil-
ity and Overall-No-Envy.
(ii) If a social choice rule ϕ satisﬁes Independence, Decentralizability and
Overall-No-Envy, then ϕ(R) ⊆ W e(R) for all R ∈R n.
Proof. It is clear that the social choice rule W e satisﬁes Independence,
Decentralizability and Overall-No-Envy.
Let ϕ be a social choice rule satisfying Independence, Decentralizability
and Overall-No-Envy. Suppose that there exist R ∈R n and (x,B) ∈ ϕ(R)
such that (x,B) / ∈ W e(R). Following the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 7, there exist h,j ∈ N such that Bh ⊂ intBj. Let R  ∈R n be
such that for all i ∈ N, R A
i = RA
i and R O
i = RO
i , and every i is a non-
consequentialist at R . By Independence, (x,B) ∈ ϕ(R ). Agent h being
15a non-consequentialist at R , it follows that (xj,B j)¯ P
 
h(xh,B h), and hence
(x,B) / ∈ ¯ F(R ). However, since ϕ satisﬁes Overall-No-Envy and (x,B) ∈
ϕ(R ), we must have (x,B) ∈ ¯ F(R ). This is a contradiction. Therefore, for
all R ∈R n, ϕ(R) ⊆ W e(R).
It may be remarked that there exists a social choice rule ϕ such that
ϕ(R) ⊆ W e(R) for all R ∈R n, and that violates Independence and Alloca-
tion Independence. The next example shows this fact. Deﬁne ψ as follows:
if agent 1 is a non-consequentialist at R ∈R n, then
ψ(R)={(x,B) | (x,B) ∈ W







Note that there exist R,R  ∈R n such that
(i) RA
i = R A
i ,R O
i = R O
i for all i ∈ N
(ii) there exist x,y ∈ W e
Z(R)=W e
Z(R ),x = y such that x1 PA
1 y1
(iii) agent 1 is a non-consequentialist at R but is not a non-consequentialist
at R .




i = R O
i for all i ∈ N. Hence, ψ violates Independence and Allocation
Independence.
Our ﬁnal remark is that there are social choice rules that satisfy Inde-
pendence, Decentralizability and Allocation-No-Envy, and such that ϕ(R)  ⊆
W e(R) for some R ∈R n. An example is the correpondence Ψ deﬁned in the
second remark to Proposition 7.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed an extended framework in which an agent is endowed
with three preference orders: an allocation preference order, an opportunity
preference order and an over-all preference order. The extended framework
reﬂects the idea that an agent cares not only about his ﬁnal consumption
bundle but also about the opportunity set from which his consumption bun-
dle is chosen. Using this framework, we have examined some classical prob-
lems such as Pareto-optimality and equity-as-no-envy of competitive market
mechanisms.
16In this paper, we have accomplished the following. First, we have demon-
strated that the classical notions like Pareto-optimality and equity-as-no-
envy can be naturally extended to examine desirability of not only allocations
but distributions of opportunities or pairs of allocations and opportunities
as well. Secondly, we have shown that, under certain conditions, competitive
market mechanisms can achieve allocation-Pareto-optimality, opportunity-
Pareto-optimality and overall-Pareto-optimality simultaneously. However,
the conditions for these claims to be true are very restrictive. For the purpose
of comparison, we have constructed examples to show the diﬃculty for com-
petitive market mechanisms to achieve both allocation-Pareto-optimality and
opportunity-Pareto-optimality as well as both allocation-Pareto-optimality
and overall-Pareto-optimality. Finally, we have established some axiomatic
characterizations of the equal income Walras rule that ﬁgures prominently
in the theory of fair allocation for exchange economies.
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